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Abstract	
This	 paper	 traces	 the	meanings	 and	 impacts	 of	 the	 increased	 and	 transformed	visibility	 of	
Muslim	communities	in	Canada,	as	evidenced	through	their	experiences	of	surveillance	and	
violence.	It	explores	the	contours	of	this	visibility	as	well	as	the	consequences.	Relationships	
between	 Muslims	 and	 non‐Muslims	 are	 shaped	 in	 and	 through	 hostility,	 harassment	 and	
violence	 which	 is	 directed	 toward	 increasingly	 visible	 Muslim	 communities.	 Guiding	 the	
analysis	 of	 the	 connections	 between	 visibility	 and	 hate	 crime	 is	 a	 frame	 that	 draws	 upon	
Brighenti’s	ideal	types	of	visibility:	media‐type,	control‐type	and	social‐type.	
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Introduction	
Just	10	days	after	the	11	September	2001	terrorist	attacks	in	the	United	States,	then‐President	
of	 the	Canadian	Arab	Foundation	 (CAF),	 John	Asfour,	 observed	 in	 a	Globe	and	Mail	 interview	
that	‘There	is	the	Canada	before	the	11th	of	September	and	now	as	I	see	it,	there	is	the	Canada	
after	the	11th	of	September’	(cited	in	Kilgour,	Millar	and	O’Neill	2002:	156).	The	Canada	‘after	
September	11’	is	one	in	which	Muslims	are	caught	anew	in	the	sights	of	media,	policy	makers,	
security	 forces	 and	 the	 broader	 public.	 Prior	 to	 9/11,	 Canadian	 Muslims	 remained	 largely	
unremarked.	They	were	not	recognized	as	a	noteworthy	presence	in	quantitative	or	qualitative	
terms.	 Indeed,	 as	 Cainkar	 (2002:	 22)	 observes,	 they	 have	 often	 been	 elided	 with	 Arabs	
generally,	 and	 thus	 ‘hidden	 under	 the	 Caucasian	 label,	 if	 not	 forgotten	 altogether’.	 The	 tragic	
events	 of	 11	 September	 2001	 changed	 that	 dramatically.	 Now	 Muslims	 are	 highly	 visible,	
regularly	(re)marked.	As	the	title	–	drawn	from	a	project	participant	–	suggests,	‘All	of	a	sudden,	
there	are	Muslims’	(Male).	Now	they	are	regularly	and	inexorably	under	the	public	gaze,	every	
action	and	utterance,	it	seems,	subject	to	close	scrutiny.		
	
At	the	heart	of	this	paper	is	an	attempt	to	trace	the	meanings	and	impacts	of	the	increased	and	
transformed	visibility	of	Muslims	in	Canada,	as	evidenced	by	the	experiences	of	participants	in	
my	recent	study	in	Ontario,	Canada.	I	am	interested	in	exploring	the	contours	of	this	visibility	–	
how	Muslims	 have	 been	 rendered	 visible	 –	 as	well	 as	 the	 consequences	 –	 how	 non‐Muslims	
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have	responded.	As	Brighenti	(2007:	325)	poses	 it:	 ‘when	something	becomes	more	visible	or	
less	visible	than	before,	we	should	ask	ourselves	who	is	acting	on	and	reacting	to	the	properties	
of	the	field	and	which	specific	relationships	are	being	shaped’.	I	am	concerned	with	how	these	
relationships	 between	 Muslims	 and	 non‐Muslims	 are	 shaped	 in	 and	 through	 hostility,	
harassment	and	violence	directed	toward	increasingly	visible	Muslim	communities.	Guiding	the	
analysis	 of	 the	 connections	 between	 visibility	 and	 hate	 crime	 is	 a	 framework	 developed	 by	
Brighenti	 (2007)	 that	 posits	 three	 distinct	 yet	 inter‐connected	 forms	 of	 visibility.	 Each	 has	
consequences	 for	 shaping	Muslim	 vulnerability	 to	 hate	 crime	 in	 either	 enabling	 or	 disabling	
ways.	
	
The	paper	 draws	on	 findings	 from	a	 series	 of	 interviews	and	 focus	 groups	with	Muslim	men,	
women	and	 youth	 in	Ottawa	and	Toronto,	 Canada.	 In	 each	 city,	we	 conducted	 eight	 in‐depth,	
semi‐structured	 interviews	with	members	 of	 local	Muslim	 organizations.	 Three	 focus	 groups	
were	also	held	in	each	of	the	cities	as	well.	We	held	separate	focus	groups	for	youth	and	women,	
as	well	as	one	open	mixed	group.	The	interviews	and	focus	groups	probed	for	insights	into	the	
contexts,	experiences	and	especially	the	impacts	of	racial	violence.	I	was	interested	in	exploring	
what	meanings	 these	 events	have	 for	 the	people	 involved	 and	 for	 their	 communities.	That	 is,	
how	fearful	of	bias‐motivated	victimization	are	Canadian	Muslims?	What	impact	does	it	have	on	
their	 sense	of	 belonging	 in	Canada?	 I	 also	highlighted	 the	 respondents’	 suggestions	 for	policy	
initiatives	or	intervention	programs	that	might	ameliorate	the	damage	to	community	harmony	
and	mitigate	future	occurrences.		
	
The	 participants	 ranged	 in	 age	 from	 16	 to	 76	 years	 of	 age;	 40	 were	 female,	 32	 were	 male.	
Culturally,	they	were	a	diverse	lot,	ranging	from	native	born	Canadians	to	people	who	had	lived	
in	 the	 country	 for	 only	 a	 few	 years	 or	 even	 a	 few	 months.	 Multiple	 nations	 of	 origin	 were	
represented,	including	India,	Pakistan,	Somalia,	Turkey,	Albania,	the	UK	and	France.	Some	were	
Imams,	 some	were	educators,	 some	were	health	professionals,	 some	were	unemployed.	Many	
were	underemployed,	having	trained	as	professionals	elsewhere	but	working	below	their	skill	
levels	in	Canada.	
	
Muslims	comprise	a	rapidly	growing	proportion	of	the	population	in	Canada.	From	1.9	per	cent	
(nearly	600,000)	in	2001,	the	Muslim	population	had	grown	to	2.7	per	cent	(nearly	900,000)	by	
2006	(Malenfant,	Lebel	and	Martel	2010).	Growth	projections	suggest	no	slowing	of	this	pace.	
By	2017,	they	may	represent	over	4	per	cent	(1.4	million)	(Belanger	and	Malenfant	2005)	and,	
by	 2031,	 Muslims	 could	 very	 well	 represent	 over	 6	 per	 cent	 (2.5	 million)	 of	 Canadians	
(Malenfant	 et	 al.	 2010).	 Approximately	 85	 per	 cent	 of	 Canadian	 Muslims	 live	 in	 major	
metropolitan	 areas,	 with	 nearly	 400,000	 in	 the	 Greater	 Toronto	 region,	 over	 150,000	 in	
Montreal,	and	nearly	60,000	in	Ottawa	(Malenfant	et	al.	2010).	Roughly	one	third	of	Canadian	
Muslims	 are	 of	 South	 Asian	 background;	 a	 third	 of	 Arab	 background;	 and	 a	 third	 of	 other	
backgrounds,	 including	African	 and	European.	 For	 some	Canadians,	 the	growth	and	diversity,	
along	 with	 the	 increasing	 visibility	 of	 these	 communities,	 appears	 to	 be	 cause	 for	 concern.	
Consequently,	negative	representations	of	Muslims	are	widespread	in	public	discourse	and	the	
media.	This	is	paralleled	by	popular	opinion	that	is	shaped	by	those	images,	as	well	as	security	
practices	that	are	similarly	grounded	in	the	association	of	Islam	with	criminality	and	terrorism.	
	
In	what	follows,	I	trace	the	connection	between	visibility,	vilification	and	violence	in	the	context	
of	Canadian	Muslims’	experiences.	I	begin	by	laying	out	Brighenti’s	understanding	of	visibilities.	
This	 provides	 the	 theoretical	 lens	 through	 which	 I	 then	 examine	 the	 construction	 and	
implications	of	Muslims’	visibility	with	respect	to	surveillance	and	control	at	the	hands	of	state	
agents	and	private	citizens	alike.	I	close	with	a	discussion	of	the	flip	side	of	visibility:	that	is,	the	
ways	in	which	their	conspicuousness	is	used	by	Muslims	to	empower	rather	than	disempower	
themselves	individually	and	collectively.	
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Visibilities		
The	analysis	offered	here	 is	a	natural	extension	of	my	earlier	work	 in	 the	 field	of	hate	 crime.	
Throughout,	I	have	consistently	characterized	hate	crime	as	a	mechanism	of	power:	
	
	…	intended	to	reaffirm	the	precarious	hierarchies	that	characterize	a	given	social	
order	…	It	is	a	means	of	marking	both	the	Self	and	the	Other	in	such	a	way	as	to	
re‐establish	their	‘proper’	relative	positions,	as	given	and	reproduced	by	broader	
ideologies	and	patterns	of	social	and	political	inequality.	(Perry	2001:	10)			
	
Moreover,	I	went	on	to	characterize	power	as	a	cornerstone	of	the	politics	of	difference,	in	that	
it	 is	 embedded	 in	 the	 struggle	 to	 set	 the	 terms	 of	 discourse	 and	 action,	 and	 to	 impose	 a	
particular	type	of	order.			
	
However,	 each	 form	 of	 power	 contains	 its	 own	 corresponding	 forms	 of	 resistance.	 Those	
relations	 of	 inequality	 must	 consistently	 be	 reproduced	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 struggle	 and	
contestation.	 Moreover,	 power	 operates	 not	 just	 at	 the	 level	 of	 state	 but	 across	 society	 in	
everyday	micropractices	or	in	‘politics	of	everyday	life’	(Fraser	1981:	272).	While	it	is	perhaps	
most	obvious	 in	the	operations	of	schools	or	prisons	or	policing,	power	also	circulates	among	
people	on	the	street.	Civilians	negotiate	their	place	through	myriad	interactions	and	assertions	
of	identity.		
	
Like	power,	visibility	 is	neither	 inherently	empowering	nor	disempowering.	On	 the	one	hand,	
both	sides	of	the	equation	may	empower	subjects.	To	be	invisible	is	to	fly	under	the	radar,	so	to	
speak,	 in	 ways	 that	 allow	 groups	 to	 exist	 unremarked	 and	 thus	 secure.	 Yet	 visibility	 –	 as	
recognition	–	allows	groups	to	engage	with	the	broader	public.	On	the	other	hand,	the	‘economy	
of	visibility’	can	also	herald	negative	effects.	Invisibility	can	render	its	subjects	impotent,	where	
it	 implies	 marginalization.	 Visibility	 at	 once	 parallels	 and	 permits	 the	 ‘normalizing	 gaze’	 by	
which	a	particular	ordering	is	created.	It	‘can	be	used	to	divide	marked	and	unmarked	persons’	
(Brighenti	 2007:	 334).	 It	 allows	 both	 self	 and	 other	 to	 be	 seen,	 but	 especially	 to	 be	 seen	 in	
relation	to	one	another.	What	is	most	significant	about	this	positioning	of	self	and	other	is	the	
fact	that	it	implies	the	normativity	of	a	hegemonic	form,	what	Lorde	(1995:	192)	refers	to	as	a	
‘mythical	 norm’,	which	 is	 ‘usually	 defined	 as	white,	 thin,	male,	 young,	 heterosexual,	 Christian	
and	financially	secure.	 	It	is	with	this	mythical	norm	that	the	trappings	of	power	reside	within	
this	society’.	Moreover,	that	which	is	considered	normal	‘is	unmarked,	unnoticed,	unthematized,	
untheorized’	(Brighenti	2007:	26).			
	
The	marking	of	difference	as	deficiency	is	a	social,	political	process	that	has	the	effect	of	creating	
hierarchies	 along	 divisions	 such	 as	 race,	 sexuality	 and	 class.	 	 Individuals	 and	 collectives	 are	
assessed	for	‘fit’	or	belonging	relative	to	the	norm.	Once	a	group	has	been	deemed	abnormal,	it	
is	necessarily	assigned	a	subordinate	place	in	society.		The	implication	for	Muslims,	in	particular	
is	that	‘it	excludes	them	from	belonging	…	by	reinforcing	a	construction	of	them	as	a	“potential	
terrorist”	and	dangerous	Other	that	is	constructed	in	opposition	to	“white”	…	subjectivity’	(Finn	
2011:	414).	Through	an	array	of	dividing	practices,	 the	threatening	Muslim	is	sorted	 from	the	
normative	Canadian,	 the	enemy	from	the	patriot,	 in	such	a	way	to	render	Muslims	visible	and	
thus	‘remarkable’.	
	
Yet	 recall	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 functioning	 of	 visibility	 is	 not	 fixed;	 it	 is	 protean	 and	 adaptive.	
Highlighting	 this	 diversity,	 Brighenti	 identifies	 three	 ideal	 types	 of	 visibility,	 which	 provide	
useful	 heuristic	 devices	 for	 the	 analysis	 that	 follows	 here.	 There	 is	what	 she	 refers	 to	 as	 the	
‘media‐type’	which	forcefully	renders	subjects	‘supra‐visible’	in	ways	that	distort	their	identities	
(Brighenti	2007:	330).	Through	myriad	discursive	processes,	 communities	 are	brought	 to	 the	
fore	 of	 public	 consciousness,	 often	 in	ways	 that	 distinguish	 them	 as	 the	 feared	 Other.	 To	 be	
‘supra‐visible’	or	‘super‐visible’	is	to	be	seen	through	a	lens	that	often	warps	the	representation	
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of	identities.	In	line	with	this	conception,	I	examine	the	emergence	of	the	popular	image	of	‘the	
Muslim’	 in	the	aftermath	of	September	11	attacks.	Their	corporal	and	discursive	presence	has	
provided	massive	fodder	for	political	and	media	portrayals.		
	
Once	marked	 in	 this	 way,	 communities	 become	 subject	 to	 the	 ‘control‐type’	 of	 visibility	 as	 a	
resource	for	 ‘regulation	or	selectivity	and	stratification,	or	both’	(Brighenti	2007:	339).	In	this	
case,	 visibility	 becomes	 the	 basis	 for	 dividing	 practices	 as	 well	 as	 for	 controlling	 forms	 of	
violence.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 popular	 representations	 of	 communities	 are	 shored	 up	 by	
parallel	 practices	 that	 draw	 further	 attention	 to	Muslims.	 State	 security	 actions,	 for	 example,	
both	 draw	 on	 and	 reinforce	 popular	 images,	 institutionalizing	 them	 within	 classification	
schema.	 This	 enables	 and	 legitimates	 subsequent	 subjugation	 and	 control	 with	 respect	 to	
stigmatized	groups.	On	the	other	hand,	once	classified	by	the	state,	such	groups	are	‘revealed’	as	
threatening,	 thereby	 (re)shaping	 popular	 reactions,	 both	 attitudinal	 and	 behavioural.	 Indeed,	
Muslims	 are	 the	 focus	 of	 heightened	 visibility	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 containment	 via	 both	 state	
surveillance	and	street	level	hate	crime.	
	
Finally,	 visibility	 is	 also	 a	 potentially	 empowering	 resource:	 social‐type,	 as	 Brighenti	 (2007:	
339)	refers	to	 it.	 In	this	model,	visibility	 is	akin	to	recognition.	 It	revolves	around	groups’	and	
individuals’	 claims	 to	 be	 ‘seen’	 and	 acknowledged.	 Indeed,	 subjects	 of	 ‘the	 gaze’	 can	 shape	
whether	and	how	they	are	seen	(Brighenti	2007:	332).	They	can	actively	exploit	their	visibility	
in	political	ways	so	that	 it	becomes	the	foundation	of	self‐conscious	action	and	for	affirmative	
recognition.	This	has	been	very	much	part	of	the	Muslim	response	to	their	misrepresentation.			
	
Constructing	visibility:	Muslims	after	9/11	
As	noted	above,	 the	Other	must	be	made	visible	before	 they	can	be	 justifiably	set	outside	 the	
parameters	of	normalcy.	Post‐9/11,	Muslims	have	 in	 fact	become	supra‐visible	and	subject	 to	
excessive	scrutiny,	such	that		‘everything	you	do	becomes	gigantic	to	the	point	that	it	paralyses	
you’	(Brighenti	2007:	330).	A	key	means	by	which	Muslims	have	been	rendered	so	very	visible	
has	been	through	political	and	media	(mis)representations.	In	fact,	Arabs	generally	and	Muslims	
specifically	may	represent	the	 last	 ‘legitimate’	subjects	of	slanderous	 imagery	and	stereotypes	
(Said	 1997;	 Suleiman1999).	 Political	 leaders,	 unfortunately,	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 this,	 as	
Muslims	can	attest:	‘I	think	it’s	just	politicians	using	terrorism	as	a	tool	…	It’s	really	putting	it	out	
there	and	making	it	become	a	really	important	part	of	people’s	consciousness’	(Female).	We	are	
by	 now	 all	 familiar	 with	 George	W	 Bush’s	 frequent	 references	 to	 ‘evil	 doers’	 –	 by	 which	 he	
singled	out	Muslims	–	 in	 the	 aftermath	of	 the	9/11	attacks.	More	 recently,	Canadian	Muslims	
have	been	vilified	by	Stephen	Harper’s	statement	that	 ‘Islamicism’	is	the	greatest	threat	to	the	
West.	This	did	not	go	unnoticed	by	participants	like	the	following,	who	commented	on	this	sort	
of	fear‐mongering:	
	
He	set	a	tone	because,	if	the	prime	minister	of	Canada,	one	of	the	most	tolerable	
[sic]	 and	 peaceful	 nations,	 is	 making	 a	 statement	 like	 that,	 it	 just	 applies	 the	
stereotypes,	 the	 hatred,	 the	 ignorance	 in	 people.	 And	 it	 just,	 it	 just	 makes	 the	
situation	worse	…	That	was	a	very	dangerous	statement.	(Female)	
	
As	this	statement	implies,	state	rhetoric,	practice	and	policy	can	provide	the	formal	framework	
within	 which	 popular	 imagery	 and	 hostility	 emerge.	 	 Political	 discourse	 reaffirms	 and	
legitimates	 the	 negative	 evaluations	 of	 difference	 that	 give	 rise	 to	 hostility,	 even	 hate	 crime.	
Muslims	in	Canada,	especially	post‐9/11,	have	been	subject	to	 the	stigmatizing	effects	of	state	
action	intended	to	control	and	contain	the	terrorist	threat	by	which	all	Muslims	become	suspect.	
Since	the	attacks,	political	and	public	figures	have	intensified	their	‘crusade’	against	Muslims.		
	
Popular	 mythologies	 of	 Islam	 are	 also	 recreated	 through	 the	 media.	 	 Muslims	 are	 cast	 as	
‘islamic,	islamic,	fundamentalism,	murderer,	terrorist,	terrorist,	terrorist.	They	repeat	ten	times	
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a	day	every	day	and	it	has,	I	think	it	has	an	impact	on	other	people’	(Male).	In	a	2002	nationwide	
survey	 of	 some	 300	 Canadian	 Muslims,	 the	 Canadian	 Council	 on	 American‐Islamic	 Relations	
(CAIR‐CAN)	 (2004)	 found	 that	 55	 per	 cent	 of	 respondents	 thought	 the	 Canadian	media	were	
more	 biased	 since	 9/11.	 A	 survey	 of	 nine	 Canadian	 newspapers	 by	 the	 Canadian	 Islamic	
Congress	 (2005)	 noted	 an	 increase	 in	 anti‐Muslim	 stereotypes	 after	 September	 2001.	 More	
recently,	 Navigator	 Research	 (2012:	 pers.	 comm.	 12	 October.)	 found	 that,	 across	 Canadian	
mainstream	media,	59	per	cent	of	news	articles	featuring	Muslims	was	negative	in	tone	(see	also	
Helly	2004,	2011).	
	
Indeed,	Muslims	 in	my	 study	were	 very	 clear	 about	 how	 deeply	 implicated	 the	media	 are	 in	
constructing	threatening	images	of	Muslims.	Consider	the	following	example:	
	
There	are	all	sorts	of	stories	spread	out,	that	Muslims	aren’t	normal,	that	there’s	
something	really	different	about	these	people.	It’s	just	the	idea	that	they	are	not	
normal,	 that	they	can’t	 fit	 in	the	West	for	some	inherent	division	between	them	
and	 the	 Western	 world,	 that	 they	 are	 inherently	 violent	 against	 women.	 That	
plays	a	lot	of	factors	into	the	idea	that	they	are	sort	of	barbaric,	just	this	idea	that	
we	 are	 not	 civilized	 and	 not	 rational,	 just	 not	 violent	 the	 way	 a	 white	 person	
would	be	violent	or	a	Christian	person	would	be	violent.	(Female)	
	
The	representations	to	which	the	participants	refer	help	to	distance	white	from	not	white.	The	
latter	 is	 to	be	 feared,	 ridiculed	 and	 loathed	 for	 their	 differences	 as	 recognized	 in	 the	popular	
psyche.	 Significantly,	 these	 legitimating	 ideologies	 and	 images	 mark	 the	 Other,	 and	 the	
boundaries	 between	 self	 and	 other.	 	 A	 young	 Muslim	man	 points	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 this	
process	of	othering	is	evident:	‘one	of	the	talk	shows	at	least	once	a	week	picks	on	some	incident	
in	Muslim	 community	 here	 or	 abroad	 in	 anywhere	 in	 the	world,	 and	 uses	 that	 to	 [say]	 “Yes,	
Muslims	are	the	bad	immigrants	or	bad	people,	they	are	not	Canadian”‘	(Male).	 	Such	negative	
constructions	of	Islam	undoubtedly	underlie	the	widespread	mistreatment	and	victimization	of	
Muslims.		
	
Rendering	visibility:	Surveillance	of	the	‘dangerous’	other	
Few	 activities	 so	 dramatically	 promote	 Muslims’	 visibility	 as	 the	 post‐9/11	 surveillance	
practices	of	Western	states.	Such	practices	have	both	actively	enhanced	the	visibility	of	Muslims	
and	 situated	 them	 as	 ‘not	 like	 us’.	 	 Contemporary	 ‘security’	 measures	 call	 attention	 to	 the	
Muslim	presence	and	the	inherent	threat	posed	by	their	presumed	traits,	as	outlined	above.	In	
short,	 excessive	 surveillance	 reinforces	 the	 normality	 of	 whiteness/Christianity,	 while	
‘abnormalizing’	non‐white	Muslims.	Their	surveillance	as	potential	 terrorists	places	 them	 in	a	
position	of	marginalization	vis‐à‐vis	white	Canadians,	who	exercise	power	over	‘brown’	bodies	
thus	marking	them	as	Other	(Finn	2011:	424).	A	Muslim	woman	speaks	of	this	in	the	context	of	
airport	 checks,	 stating	 that,	 because	 of	 such	 practices,	 ‘I	 think	 we	 feel	 even	 further	 more	
ostracized’.	
	
One	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 demonization	 of	 Muslims	 on	 the	 part	 of	 politicians	 (noted	
above)	is	that	it	finds	its	way	into	policies	and	practices	that	further	stigmatize	the	group.	This	is	
especially	 the	 case	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 activities	 of	 law	 enforcement	 and	 security	 agencies.	
Anyone	who	displays	an	interest	in	Middle	Eastern	affairs	or	who	is	noticeably	devout	in	their	
religion	is	vulnerable	to	scrutiny	by	federal	agencies	in	particular.		Participants	recognized	this	
risk	and	its	impact:	
	
…	some	practicing	Muslims	are	 really	afraid	of	 large	Muslim	groups	and	seeing	
that	 you	might	be	being	 followed	by	CSIS.	My	mom	was	 really	 stringent	 on	me	
saying,	‘Stay	away	from	the	MSA.	I	know	they’re	very	good	people,	they	do	great	
things	but	you	could	be	put	in	danger’.	(Male)		
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Here,	Muslim	 identity	 is	 taken	 to	 signify	 terrorist	 identity,	 such	 that	Muslims	 are	marked	 as	
different	from	and	indeed	threatening	to	‘good’	Canadians.		
	
Particularly	 in	 the	 context	 of	 politically	 charged	 events	 like	 terrorist	 attacks,	 government	
agencies	step	up	their	engagement	with	Muslims	(Bahdi	2003;	Helly	2004,	2011).	This	has	been	
readily	apparent	in	Canada,	for	example,	since	the	September	11	attacks.	Fast	on	the	heels	of	the	
attacks,	Canada	joined	the	US	and	UK	in	an	ill‐considered	flurry	of	legislative	activity	intended	to	
strengthen	anti‐terrorism	legislation.	These	revisions	allow	for	an	unprecedented	extension	of	
intrusive	 law	 enforcement	 activities	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 contraction	 of	 individual	 and	
collective	 rights	 on	 the	 other.	 A	 2005	 CAIR‐CAN	 report	 documents	 extensive	 experiences	 in	
which	 law	 enforcement	 agents	 (Canadian	 Security	 and	 Intelligence	 Service	 (CSIS),	 Royal	
Canadian	Mounted	Police	(RCMP),	police)	‘approached’	or	‘contacted’	Arabs	and	Muslims,	often	
with	no	explanation	for	the	contact.	Of	the	467	respondents,	8	per	cent	had	been	contacted	–	the	
bulk	 of	 whom	 (84	 per	 cent)	 were	 Canadian	 citizens.	 Among	 those	 who	 were	 not	 directly	
contacted,	 nearly	 half	 (43	 per	 cent)	 knew	 at	 least	 one	 other	 Canadian	Muslim	who	had	 been	
(CAIR‐CAN	2005).	Moreover,	19	per	cent	of	 those	who	had	been	contacted	 indicated	 that	 this	
was	not	a	single	event,	but	characterized	by	multiple	contacts.		
	
Participants	in	my	study	also	shared	tales	of	hyper‐surveillance,	where	they	or	someone	close	to	
them	were	 subject	 to	 scrutiny	 in	 their	personal	 and	public	 lives.	 Such	 incidents	 took	place	 in	
their	homes,	 in	 their	workplaces	 and	 in	border	 zones,	 and	 served	 to	mark	 them	as	 racialized	
Muslims	and	thus	‘suspect’.	Consider	the	following	illustrative	example:	
	
My	father	had	a	CSIS	interview	because	he’s	an	Imam	in	Kanata,	so	they	thought	
he’s	a	big	authority	figure.	So	they	were	thinking	Oh	he’s	telling	you	whatever.	I	
mean,	they	sat	him	down.	He	went	through	an	interview.	Our	phones	were	being	
tapped,	 I	know	that	 for	 sure.	And	 it	was	 frightening	…	And	 then	when	 the	CSIS	
people	called	him	for	an	interview	and	everything,	it	was,	like,	so	frightening;	not	
only	for	me,	for	my	mother.	It	was	the	worst	feeling	because	it	was	like	‘Where’s	
the	trust?’	Just	because	he	has	a	beard?	(Female)	
	
The	 effect	 of	 these	 patterns	 is	 to	 draw	 a	 line	 between	 ‘law	 abiding’	 Canadians	 and	 ‘terrorist’	
Muslims.	It	reinforces	the	public	perception	that	Muslims	are	questionable	with	respect	to	their	
loyalty	 to	 Canada	 and	 with	 respect	 to	 their	 knowledge	 of,	 if	 not	 involvement	 in,	 terrorism.	
However	 unfounded	 the	 police	 attention	 may	 be,	 it	 nonetheless	 leaves	 a	 lingering	 sense	 of	
doubt.	The	pattern	of	state	badgering	of	Muslims:	
	
…	makes	people	feel	comfortable	with	their	prejudices	and	grants	those	who	hold	
pre‐existing	 racist	 attitudes	 permission	 to	 express	 those	 attitudes	 and	 expect	
them	to	be	taken	seriously.	It	empowers	individual	prejudices	and	fuels	popular	
fears.	(Bahdi	2003:	314)	
	
Punishing	visibility:	Hate	crime	
The	rhetoric	of	hate	does	not	fall	on	deaf	ears.	The	most	recent	survey	results	available	(Geddes	
2013)	underscore	the	persistence	of	widespread	antipathy	toward	Muslims,	finding	that	54	per	
cent	of	Canadians	held	an	unfavourable	view	of	Islam,	up	sharply	from	46	per	cent	2009.	To	put	
this	 in	 perspective,	 39	 per	 cent	 held	 an	 unfavourable	 opinion	 of	 Sikhism;	 all	 of	 the	 other	
religions	were	regarded	unfavourably	by	less	than	30	per	cent	of	Canadians.	A	2006	Environics	
poll	sheds	some	light	on	the	connection	between	the	negative	representations	described	above	
and	public	opinion.	It	found	that	Canadians	who	believe	that	a	growing	sense	of	Islamic	identity	
in	Canada	is	bad	for	the	country	most	often	cite	perceived	poor	treatment	of	women	and	girls	
(36%)	in	Islam	as	their	main	worry.	An	additional	three	in	ten	(30%)	say	that	the	possibility	of	
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violence	perpetrated	by	Muslims	is	their	main	worry	(see	also	Navigator	Research	2012:	pers.	
comm.	12	October).	
	
Ultimately,	these	sentiments	are	also	precursors	to	hate‐motivated	violence.	One	participant	in	
my	study	stated	 that	 ‘the	media’s	 created	an	enemy	and	 they’re	 attacking	 the	enemy	because	
that’s	what	they’ve	been	told	to	do	by	the	media’	(Female).	 	Thus,	it	is	not	only	the	gaze	of	the	
state	that	constrains.	Public	scrutiny	and	reaction	also	seek	to	limit	the	inclusion	of	Muslims	into	
the	broader	community.	 Indeed,	 the	consequences	of	visibility	and	 its	attendant	division	of	us	
and	them	are	obvious	in	the	context	of	hate	crime.	Corresponding	to	the	enhanced	corporal	and	
discursive	visibility	of	Muslims	has	been	a	sharp	increase	in	violence	and	harassment	directed	
toward	those	deemed	to	be	from	that	‘feared’	community	(Poynting	and	Perry	2007).	
	
That	Muslims	are	over‐represented	as	victims	of	hate	crime	is	suggested	by	the	finding	that,	in	
2011,	Muslims	represented	about	15	per	cent	of	all	victims	of	hate	crime	motivated	by	religion.	
Added	 to	 this	 is	 the	 fact	 that	more	 than	 25	 per	 cent	 of	 racially	motivated	 hate	 crimes	were	
perpetrated	against	East/South	East	Asians,	 South	Asians	and	Arab/West	Asians,	 ethno‐racial	
groups	 typically	perceived	by	 the	 general	population	as	 likely	 to	be	Muslim	 (Allen	and	Boyce	
2013).	From	being	virtually	absent	before	2001,	hate	crimes	against	Muslims	rose	dramatically	
in	 the	months	 after	 September	2001	 (Helly	 2004,	 2011).	 In	Montréal,	 for	 example,	 the	police	
recorded	about	a	dozen	complaints	from	11	September	to	20	September	2001.	The	Council	on	
American	 Islamic	 Relations	 (Hussain	 2002)	 recorded	 approximately	 fifty	 incidents	 in	 Canada	
between	11	 September	 and	15	November	2001,	 including	 death	 threats,	 and	 assaults	 (Nimer	
2001).	Municipal	police	departments	in	Canada	also	reported	an	upsurge	of	(racist)	hate	crimes,	
almost	all	of	which	were	related	to	the	September	2001	attacks	(Helly	20011).		
	
Violence	and	intimidation	are	devices	available	to	counter	a	perceived	‘threat’	and	thus	remind	
Muslims	 of	 ‘their	 place’	 in	 the	 cultural	 hierarchy.	 Interestingly,	 few	 of	 the	 participants	 had	
experienced	 serious	 violence,	 although	 most	 had	 been	 targets	 of	 verbal	 abuse.	 Moreover,	
virtually	everyone	had	multiple	stories	 to	share	about	 incidents	that	 they	had	witnessed	or	of	
which	 they	 were	 otherwise	 aware.	 Among	 the	 physical	 assaults	 were	 incidents	 like	 the	
following:	
	
I	was	choked	and	physically	assaulted,	plus	threatened	because	I	said,	declared	I	
was	Muslim	and	would	not	change	my	religion.	(Male)		
	
I	 was	 walking	 through	 my	 neighbourhood	 with	 my	 Muslim	 friends	 when	
someone	 threw	 a	 bottle	 of	 urine	 at	 us	 from	 a	 car	 window	 and	 drove	 away,	
laughing	and	calling	us	terrorists.	(Female)	
	
Additionally,	 as	 signs	 of	 Islam,	 Muslim	 centres	 of	 worship,	 and	 community	 centres	 are	 also	
frequent	targets:	
	
I	know	obviously,	like,	hate	crimes	that	have	been	directed	–	not	towards	me	but	
towards	 the	 mosque,	 ‘cause	 the	 mosque	 in	 my	 city	 had	 fire,	 like,	 bombing	
attempts,	like,	twice.	Not	bombing	attempts.	Arson	attempts	twice.	(Female)	
	
Visibility	emerges	where	Islam	transgresses	geographical	and	cultural	borders	and	thus	comes	
to	represent	a	threat.	The	sentiment	that	Islam	is	invading	their	territory,	the	fear	of	losing	one’s	
‘home’,	is	widely	expressed	in	the	context	of	Islamophobic	violence.	This	provides	both	motive	
and	rationale	for	injurious	verbal	and	physical	assaults	on	Muslims.	A	Muslim	woman	speaks	to	
a	cluster	of	perceived	threats	that	underlie	public	hostility	and	violence:	
	
For	 the	most	part,	 it’s	 just,	A	–	 they	 feel	 that	your	overtaking	 their	 land;	or	B	–	
they	 feel	 that	 you	will	 never	 fit	 into	 society;	 or	 C	 –	 they	 just	 feel	 like	 you	 are	
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plotting	in	the	garage.	And,	like	my	Dad	would	spend	an	incessant	amount	of	time	
in	the	garage	…	and	they	would	freak	out	because	they	would	assume	that	he	is	
making	something.	(Female)	
	
Additionally,	Muslim	bodies	–	‘as	mediums	to	show	religion’	–	are	becoming	increasingly	visible	
(Wagner	2011:	43).	It	is	not	just	the	rhetorical	representations	of	Muslims	that	brings	them	to	
the	public	eye.	Rather	it	is	also	the	correspondence	of	these	images	with	their	physical	presence	
that	renders	them	vulnerable	to	harassment	and	violence	in	the	public	sphere.	As	noted	at	the	
outset,	the	absolute	number	of	Muslims	has	grown	dramatically	just	since	the	beginning	of	the	
millennium.	Additionally,	Wagner	(2011:	43)	remarks	on	how	Muslims	are	much	more	obvious	
in	 the	 streets	 by	 virtue	 of	 their	 dress,	 their	 appearance	 and	 their	mosques.	 ‘All	 of	 a	 sudden’,	
suggests	 a	 Muslim	 male,	 ‘there	 are	 Muslims.	 There	 is	 backlash,	 a	 movement	 to	 control	 the	
“infiltration”	 of	 Muslims.	 There	 are	 anti‐Muslim/racist	 radio	 shows	 and	 TV	 shows’.	 Muslim	
bodies	are	now	increasingly	within	our	gaze.		
	
Muslims	 in	 Canada,	 since	 at	 least	 the	1990s,	 have	 expressed	 themselves	 bodily	 through	 their	
sartorial	representations	of	identity.	The	experiences	of	participants	in	my	study	make	it	clear	
that	 they	 understand	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 type	 of	 visibility	 for	 attempts	 to	 further	
marginalize	 them	 through	 violence.	 Visibility	 becomes	 the	 context	 and	 impetus	 for	 outward	
attacks	 on	 those	 who	 ‘look’	 Muslim.	 Several	 participants	 remarked	 on	 this,	 with	 particular	
emphasis	on	Muslim	women’s	particular	vulnerability.	Indeed,	evidence	appears	to	be	mounting	
that	Muslim	women	may	be	unexpectedly	vulnerable	to	Islamophobic	violence	(Githens‐Mazer	
and	Lambert	2010;	Perry	2013).	One	woman	explicitly	noted	that	 ‘the	people	that	are	at	most	
risk	of	receiving	hate	crime	are	the	people	who	look	visibly	Muslim.	Like	a	Muslim	woman	who	
walks	down	the	street,	and	she	wears	a	niqab’.		
	
Another	part	of	the	Muslim	community	that	is	particularly	vulnerable	to	hate	are	those	who	are	
visible	by	virtue	of	their	activism.	The	risk	of	violence	becomes	even	greater	for	those	who	are	
both	seen	and	heard.	The	posture	of	entitlement	 taken	by	Muslim	activists	 can	be	 seen	as	 an	
affront	 to	white	dominance	 in	 that	 they	 are	perceived	 to	be	 violating	 the	 anticipated	 rules	of	
behavior.	Should	they	step	outside	the	permissible	boundaries	that	define	‘a	good	Muslim’,	they	
become	vulnerable	to	retaliatory	violence.			
	
I	 think	 it	 is	 this	 the	 dichotomization	 of	 the	 Muslim	 community	 into	 the	 good	
Muslim	 and	 the	 bad	 Muslim	 which	 is	 what	 allows	 the	 people	 who	 are	 visibly	
Muslim,	who	are	cast	as	the	bad	Muslim	to	bear	the	brunt	of	that	violence,	while	
others	of	us	marginally	escape	that.	(Female)	
	
Seen	in	this	light,	hate	crime	can	be	seen	as	a	reactionary	tool,	a	resource	for	the	reassertion	of	
whiteness	over	color.		It	is	a	form	of	‘resistance	to	any	diminishment	in	the	authorial	claims	of	a	
particular	 white	 identity’	 (Hesse,	 Rai,	 Bennett	 and	 McGilchrist	 1992:	 172).	 	 One	 very	 active	
woman	described	the	risks	she	withstands	on	a	regular	basis:	
	
We,	myself,	as	a	leader,	get	a	lot	of	threatening	phone	calls,	which	are	frightening.	
And	 the	 tone,	 for	 what	 they	 write	 about	 me;	 the	 caricature	 they	 make	 of	 me,	
which	 is	 remarkable,	 they	 are	most	 disgusting.	 And	 I	 also	wear	 hijab	 for	what	
they	do.	And	I	think,	that’s	very	frightening.	That’s	very,	very	intimidating.	…	So	
it’s	a	very	risky	thing	that	I	do.	(Female)	
	
Bias	motivated	violence,	then,	is	available	as	a	response	‐‐	albeit	a	violent	and	extreme	one	‐‐	to	
the	 Other	 who	 is	 out	 of	 control,	 who	 has	 overstepped	 his	 or	 her	 social,	 political	 or	 even	
geographical	boundaries.		
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Empowering	visibility:	Becoming	‘normal’	
Visibility	 is	 a	 double	 edged	 sword.	 While	 it	 can	 provoke	 negative	 reactions,	 it	 can	 also	 be	
empowering	(Brighenti	2007:	340).	This	is	key	to	resisting	the	subjugation	described	above:	to	
neutralize	the	‘normalizing	gaze’	by	controlling	it,	rather	than	letting	it	control	Muslims.	Indeed,	
many	Muslims	with	whom	I	spoke	insisted	on	embracing	visibility:	
	
I	had	never	really	worn	the	hijab	before,	but	for	a	short	period	of	time,	right	after	
9/11	I	started	wearing	it	as	a	sign	of	defiance,	you	know?	And	I	also	knew	that	it	
wasn’t	my	style	and	I	wasn’t	going	to	keep	it	on	for	too	long	but	it	was	definitely	a	
time	when	I	felt	like	being	more	visibly	Muslim	was	necessary	for	me	to	deal	with	
all	 the	 anti‐Muslim	 sentiments	 and	 hate	 that	 was	 going	 around	 in	 my	 school.	
(Female)		
	
This	 is	 a	 powerful	 reminder	 that	 persistent	 surveillance	 and	 categorization	 can	 be	 directly	
challenged	 through	 equally	 persistent	 expressions	 of	 Muslim	 identities.	 Visibility	 becomes	 a	
show	 of	 strength	 that	 reflects	 the	 wielding	 of	 power	 by	 its	 very	 subjects.	 It	 reimagines	 ‘the	
performance	 of	 visible	 differences	 as	 the	 locus	 of	 political	 agency	 because	 of	 its	 potential	 to	
deconstruct	foundational	categories	of	identity’	(Walker	1993:	868).	It	is,	in	essence,	a	demand	
for	recognition	and	acknowledgement	of	their	identities	as	valued	rather	than	subjugated:	
	
A	person	can	and	should	be	able	to	be	proud	and	say	that,	 ‘Yes,	 I’m	a	Canadian,	
but	I	also	identify	as	this’.	I	want	to	be	distinguishable,	I	want	to,	I	want	people	to	
recognize	me	as	what	I	want	them	to	recognize	me	as.	So	I	want	to	be	able	to	walk	
in	 the	 street	 and	 somebody	 say,	 ‘Yes	 this	 person	 is	 a	Muslim	 and	 a	 Canadian’.	
(Male)	
	
A	key	point	of	intervention	in	disrupting	the	controlling	gaze	is	to	resist	the	representations	that	
underlie	it,	since	‘one’s	positioning	behind	or	beyond	the	thresholds	of	fair	visibility	raises	the	
problem	of	 the	management	of	 one’s	 social	 image	 in	one’s	own	 terms’	 (Brighenti	2007:	330).	
This	is	a	call	to	render	positive	narratives	of	Islam	that	counter	the	distorted	ones	expressed	by	
politicians	and	the	media.	The	alternative	is	to	construct	highly	visible	and	affirmative	accounts	
of	Islam.	
	
For	some	participants,	the	most	direct	way	to	achieve	this	was	thought	to	be	through	individual	
interactions	with	non‐Muslims.	They	felt	that	openly	sharing	their	own	beliefs,	values	and	rites	
was	an	 important	corrective.	For	example,	 ‘just	by	simply	 talking	 to	a	stranger	and	being	 like	
“Hey.	I’m	not	scary.	I’m	a	friendly	person”.	It	creates	an	image	for	them	and	they	in	turn	will	tell,	
“Hey.	I	met	this,	like,	Muslim	girl	and	she’s	actually	pretty	cool”‘	(Female).	Others	spoke	of	their	
relationships	 with	 their	 non‐Muslim	 friends,	 and	 how	 they	 were	 able	 to	 break	 through	 the	
stereotypes	simply	by	being	themselves.		
	
For	 others,	 the	 crucial	 arenas	 for	 intervention	 were	 seen	 to	 be	 the	 very	 institutions	 noted	
earlier:	politics	and	media.	There	was	a	strong	recognition	of	the	need	to	directly	engage	with	
them	 in	 order	 to	 re‐image	Muslims.	 Some	 spoke	 of	 the	need	 to	 hold	political	 leaders	 and	 the	
media	accountable	for	shaping	the	operation	of	the	normalizing	–	and	stigmatizing	–	gaze.	There	
is	much	work	to	be	done	in	both	of	those	contexts:	
	
So	 I	 think	 the	 big	 political	 leaders,	 not	 only	 in	 Canada,	 but	 global	 scale,	 the	
international	 political	 leaders,	 need	 to	 think	 about	 their	 rhetoric	 because	
whatever	 they	 say	 is	 taken	 out	 by	 the	 media	 and	 that	 sort	 of	 creates	 and	
perpetuates	 the	 image.	…	 	 I	 think	 it’s	 the	politicians’	 responsibility	not	 to	other	
others	and	create	these	negative	images	in	society.	(Male)	
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There	was,	of	course,	some	cynicism	about	the	willingness	and	ability	of	the	mainstream	media	
to	 offer	 alternative	 and	 constructive	 voices.	 Some,	 then,	 highlighted	 the	 potential	 of	
representing	themselves	through	Muslim‐based	media	venues.	This	is	an	increasingly	common	
practice	 among	 minority	 communities	 in	 Canada,	 where	 ethnic	 media	 provide	 counter	
discourses	(Lindgren	2013).		As	one	participant	in	my	study	put	it:	
	
There	should	be	a	strong	 journalism	 in	 the	Muslim	community	also.	The	youth,	
especially	 the	 kids.	 There	 should	 be	 some	 system	 from	mosques,	 from	 Islamic	
centres,	even	from	the	government,	where	there	should	be	a	special	 funding	on	
people	 who	 have	 good	 writing	 skills.	 Yes,	 they	 should	 write.	 You	 know	 that	
Canada	 is	 a	 liberal	 country	 you	 can	 do	 whatever	 you	 want;	 if	 they’re	 writing	
against	you,	you	counter	attack	them.	You	write	what	is	right.	(Male)	
	
The	point	of	these	interventions	is	to	resist	the	‘dividing	practices’	to	which	I	alluded	early	in	the	
paper.	The	challenge	for	Muslim	communities	is	to	defy	categorization	as	the	dangerous	other,	
to	 overcome	 the	 sentiment	 noted	 earlier	wherein	 the	more	Muslim	 one	 is,	 the	 less	 Canadian	
they	 are	 held	 to	 be.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 this	 demands	 that	 Muslims	 develop	within	 their	 own	
communities	the	sense	of	belonging,	of	sharing	both	Muslim	and	Canadian	identities:	
	
We	 should	 realize	 that	 as	Muslims,	we	 can	 live	 here	 and	 become	 Canadians	 as	
well.	 Like,	 there	 should	 be	 no	 clash	 between	 the	 two,	 between	 Canadian	 and	
Muslim,	you	know?	Like	both	of	them	can	become	as	one.	And	the	two	do	not,	are	
not	against	each	other.	(Female)	
	
This	turns	the	‘normalizing	gaze’	on	its	head,	where	the	intent	is	to,	in	fact	normalize	rather	than	
abnormalize	Muslims.	They	are	to	become	recognized	as	part	of	the	broader	acceptable	ethnic	
landscape	 of	 this	 multicultural	 nation.	 This	 sober	 sentiment	 is	 captured	 in	 the	 following	
otherwise	humourous	assessment:		
	
One	thing,	which	is	a	good	sign	for	me,	that	our	community	is	being	accepted,	is	
when	 our	 young	 sisters	 in	 hijab	 are	 being	 flirted,	 flirted	with	 by	 non‐Muslims!	
Non‐Muslim	young	men	are	flirting	with	hijabi	women.	And	you	say,	 ‘Well	what	
kind	 of	 a	 statement	 is	 that?’!	 I’m	 saying	 it	 because,	 the	 hijab	 has,	 is	 becoming	
normal	 .	 .	 .	 Our	 presence	 is	 becoming	 normal.	 That’s	 when	 we	 fit	 in;	 then	 we	
belong	and	we’re	not	the	other.	There	is	no	us	and	them;	it’s	us.	(Male)	
	
Contrast	this	with	the	statement	cited	earlier	wherein	a	Muslim	woman	protested	that	popular	
images	construct	Muslims	as	not	normal.	Instead,	underlying	the	humour	here	is	the	assumption	
that	only	when	Muslims	can	live	visibly	and	without	othering	can	they	truly	feel	themselves	to	
be	within	 the	 bounds	 of	what	 is	 considered	Canadian.	Only	 then	 does	 visibility	 cease	 to	 be	 a	
trap.	Instead,	it	becomes	yet	another	marker	of	what	it	is	to	be	Canadian.		
	
Conclusion		
The	 post‐9/11	 context	 across	 the	West	 unquestioningly	 presents	 challenges	 for	 increasingly	
visible	Muslim	 communities.	 Yet	 the	 narratives	 shared	 here	 are	 an	 important	 reminder	 that	
those	challenges	also	present	opportunities.	This	paper	has	highlighted	the	ways	in	which	the	
transformed	 and	 transformative	 visibility	 of	 Muslim	 communities	 in	 Canada	 has	 been	
simultaneously	disempowering	and	empowering.	The	ambiguity	of	visibility	is	what	makes	it	a	
valuable	 resource	 for	 affirming	 Muslim	 identities	 and	 agency.	 By	 turning	 their	 faces	 toward	
rather	 than	 away	 from	 ‘the	 gaze’,	 Muslims	 ‘symbolize	 their	 demands	 for	 social	 justice	 by	
celebrating	 visible	 signifiers	 of	 difference	 that	 have	 historically	 targeted	 them	 for	
discrimination’	(Walker	1993:	868).		
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Framing	 Muslims’	 stories	 within	 Brighenti’s	 (2007)	 understanding	 of	 visibilities,	 I	 have	
highlighted	the	impact	of	being	constantly	seen	in	terms	of	discursive	representations,	state	and	
popular	 surveillance	 and	 harassment,	 and	 finally,	 Muslim	 activism.	 Political	 and	 media	
distortions	 render	 largely	 one	 dimensional	 images	 of	Muslims	 that	 separate	 them	out	 as	 ‘not	
Canadian’	 by	 virtue	 of	 their	 putative	 values	 and	 ‘inherent’	 connection	 to	 terrorism.	 These	
constructs,	 then,	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 communities	 by	 directing	 a	 normalizing	 gaze	 in	 their	
direction.	By	virtue	of	 their	recognition	and	their	physical	presence,	 they	become	(re)marked,	
noticed,	and	reviled.	This,	then,	sets	them	up	for	harassment	by	both	state	agents	and	members	
of	the	public	who	apply	an	array	of	 ‘dividing	practices’	that	seek	to	marginalize	them	and	thus	
contain	the	‘threat’	they	are	thought	to	pose.		
	
Yet,	by	the	same	token,	many	Muslims	choose	to	consciously	resist	the	normalizing	gaze	and,	in	
fact,	 celebrate	 their	 visibility	 as	 a	 means	 by	 which	 to	 affirm	 their	 normalcy	 rather	 than	
abnormalcy,	and	their	identities	as	Muslim	and	Canadian.	In	brief,	the	conclusion	to	be	drawn	is	
that,	 on	 the	one	hand,	Muslims	have	been	 rendered	visible	with	 the	 intent	 to	distinguish	and	
differentiate	them	from	‘real’	Canadians.	Yet,	on	the	other	hand,	many	Muslims	have	also	opted	
to	 render	 themselves	 visible	 with	 exactly	 the	 opposite	 intent:	 that	 is,	 to	 normalize	 as	 real	
‘Canadians’.	
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